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 Abstract 
 Th is article is part of a larger project to analyse the rarely-considered gender aspects of the crime 
of aggression and to explore whether or not the amendments adding the crime of aggression to the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) represent an advancement for women. Th is 
piece focuses on the potential for the new provisions to chill  bona ﬁ de exercises of humanitar-
ian intervention given that (1) the crime is expansively drafted to potentially cover all uses of 
sovereign force, (2) delegates rejected eﬀ orts by the United States to include an express exception 
for military operations launched to prevent the commission of other crimes within the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC, and (3) other proposals that would have prevented humanitarian interventions 
from being considered ‘acts of aggression’ were not fully explored or implemented. Th e article 
acknowledges that feminist theory may never fully come to terms with a notion of humanitarian 
intervention given the doctrine’s valorisation of militarism, especially in light of the fact that women 
are so often excluded from decisions about uses of force. It nonetheless argues that if 
we want to hold out the possibility of humanitarian intervention being deployed in defence of 
women, elements of the new provisions (such as the terms ‘manifest’, ‘character’, ‘gravity’, and 
‘consequences’) should be interpreted to exclude situations involving the nascent responsibility to 
protect doctrine. 
 Keywords 
 international criminal law ;  International Criminal Court (ICC) ;  women ;  crime of aggression ; 
 national sovereignty ;  humanitarian intervention ;  just war 
 1. Introduction 
 Any feminist defence of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention must take as 
its starting point the recognition that the substantial denial of women’s rights – 
whether civil, political, economic, social, or cultural – has never served as the 
 *)  Th e author served as the Academic Advisor to the U.S. delegation for the ICC Review Conference 
in Kampala, Uganda. Th e views expressed herein are her own. Th e author is grateful for the feed-
back of all the participants in the Conference on Women and International Criminal Law co-
hosted by IntLawGrrls and the American Society of International Law and especially the generous 
comments of Diane Marie Amann, Margaret deGuzman, and Jaya Ramji-Nogales. 
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sole or primary basis for military intervention. 1 Advocating the deployment of 
humanitarian intervention on behalf of women requires an acceptance of the 
legitimacy, if not lawfulness, of the use of armed force without Security Council 
approval. 2 Th is, in turn, requires a coming to terms with a certain valorisation of 
militarism and its inherent masculinities – a perspective that is alien to much 
feminist thinking. Nonetheless, while women remain under the threat of mass 
violence, we should not foreclose ongoing eﬀ orts to develop a workable doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention to prevent the commission of grave crimes that are 
subject to prosecution before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the 
event of Security Council political paralysis or inaction. 
 If we hold out the possibility that humanitarian intervention might someday 
be deployed to protect women from the ravages of war and gender-based vio-
lence, we should be concerned about the threat of over-deterrence posed by the 
new provisions on the crime of aggression 3 recently added to the ICC Statute. 4 
Th e crime of aggression is expansively drafted in a way that implicates all uses of 
force that might be construed to constitute a ‘manifest’ violation of the U.N. 
Charter. Whereas the concept of self-defence has a Charter basis 5 and is relatively 
well established under international law, the right to use force in defence of others 
is more contested. As a result, the codiﬁ cation of the crime of aggression and the 
eventual threat of prosecution may chill those uses of force that are protective in 
nature, such as interventions pursuant to the nascent doctrine of responsibility to 
 1)   See Christine Chinkin, ‘A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force’, 12 
 Australian Year Book of International Law (1988-89) 290 (“Oppression and acts of brutality 
towards women have never been regarded in the same light as slavery, genocide and apartheid”); 
 see also ibid. , p. 291 (“Th e invisibility of women in any legal justiﬁ cations for the use of force is 
striking.”). 
 2)   See Independent International Commission on Kosovo ,  Th e Kosovo Report: Conﬂ ict, International 
Response, Lessons Learned  ( Oxford University press, Oxford, 2000 ) p . 4, < www.reliefweb.int/library/
documents/thekosovoreport.htm >, 17 February 2011 (“Th e Commission concludes that the 
NATO military intervention was illegal, but legitimate.”). 
 3)  Th is article is part of a larger project to analyse the rarely-considered gender aspects of the crime 
of aggression and to explore whether or not the amendments to the ICC Statute represent an 
advancement for women.  See also Beth Van Schaack, ‘Th e Grass Th at Gets Trampled When 
Elephants Fight: Will the Codiﬁ cation of the Crime of Aggression Protect Women?’, 15  UCLA 
Journal of International Law & Foreign Aﬀ airs (2011) __ (forthcoming). 
 4)  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 36(8), 1 July 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter ICC Statute]. Th e aggression amendments, which will not take eﬀ ect until completion 
of a ratiﬁ cation process, are the result of a Review Conference held in 2010 in Kampala, Uganda. 
For a discussion of the negotiations surrounding the crime of aggression,  see the IntLawGrrls series 
on aggression, <intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/search/label/Crime%20of%20aggression%20series>, 
and the Kampala Conference, <intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/search/label/Kampala%20ICC%20
series>.  See also Beth Van Schaack, ‘Negotiating at the Interface of Power & Law: Th e Crime of 
Aggression’, 49  Colorado Journal of Transnational Law  (2011) __ ( forthcoming ),  available at 
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1668661>. 
 5)  U.N. Charter, Art. 51. 
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protect. 6 Such uses of force do not directly implicate sovereign prerogatives in the 
way that other uses of force of questionable legality – such as acts of pre-emptive/
preventative self-defence or military responses to acts of terrorism – might. For 
this reason, humanitarian uses of force may be more susceptible to processes of 
deterrence. Th e potential for over-deterrence should be a concern for those of us 
working to enhance the ability of international law to improve women’s lives and 
protect them from abuse. 
 With the drafting process behind us, whether or not the Court will hear aggres-
sion cases involving humanitarian interventions now depends on the attitudes of 
members of the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Council – which are 
empowered to refer situations to the Court – as well as the discretion of the 
Prosecutor. During the aggression negotiations, the United States delegation 
endeavoured to create a space in the deﬁ nition of aggression to argue the legality 
of  bona ﬁ de humanitarian interventions. 7 Th e most pointed proposals of the 
United States were ultimately not implemented. Th ere is language, however, in 
the ﬁ nal resolution adopting the aggression amendments that should be inter-
preted by these actors to exempt  bona ﬁ de humanitarian interventions from pros-
ecution as the crime of aggression. 
 6)   See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),  Th e Responsibility 
to Protect (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001) p. 69 (explaining that 
“the  responsibility to protect its people from killing and other grave harm was the most basic and 
fundamental of all the responsibilities that sovereignty imposes—and that if a state cannot or will 
not protect its people from such harm, then coercive intervention for human protection purposes, 
including ultimately military intervention, by others in the international community may be war-
ranted in extreme cases”.);  2005 World Summit Outcome, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 60/1 
(U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1) para. 138, (24 October 2005); U.N. Security Council Resolution 
1674 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674) para. 4, (28 April 2006) (containing a reaﬃ  rmation by the 
Security Council that “the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”).  But see Chair of the High-Level Panel 
on Th reats, Challenges & Change, Transmittal Letter from the Chair of the High-Level Panel on 
Th reats ,  Challenges and Change addressed to the Secretary-General (U.N. Doc. A/59/565) para. 203, 
(2 December 2004) (envisioning the responsibility to protect doctrine as limited to action by the 
Security Council). 
 7)  Th is position reﬂ ected themes from President Obama’s Nobel acceptance speech: 
 More and more, we all confront diﬃ  cult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civil-
ians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suﬀ ering can engulf 
an entire region. I believe that force can be justiﬁ ed on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the 
Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and 
can lead to more costly intervention later. 
 See Barack H. Obama,  Nobel Lecture by Barack H. Obama: A Just and Lasting Peace , 10 December 
2009, <nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html>. 
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 2. Deconstructing the Crime of Aggression 
 References to sex and gender pervade the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), not only in its substantive law, but also in its structures and proce-
dures. In particular, the ICC Statute contains an expansive list of gender crimes in 
the war crimes and crimes against humanity provisions. 8 Persecution on the basis 
of gender – along with ethnicity or race – is penalized. 9 Th e deﬁ nition of geno-
cide in Article 6 mirrors that of the Genocide Convention, but the Elements of 
Crimes – drafted to assist the ICC in interpreting its substantive oﬀ enses – note 
that “serious bodily or mental harm” “may include, but is not necessarily restricted 
to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment”. 10 In 
terms of personnel, the ICC Statute requires states parties to choose judges and 
other staﬀ  with experience with “violence against women or children” 11 and calls 
for “fair representation of female and male judges”. 12 Th e ICC Statute also con-
tains a non-discrimination provision stating that the ICC’s application and inter-
pretation of the law must be consistent with internationally recognised human 
rights and be without adverse distinction founded on,  inter alia , gender. 13 
 Th ese provisions in the ICC Statute are the result of the intense and coordi-
nated advocacy work of a coalition of women’s groups, then called the Women’s 
Caucus for Gender Justice, which was active during the drafting of the ICC 
Statute. 14 To achieve these provisions, the Caucus had to overcome signiﬁ cant 
resistance from a handful of states and non-governmental delegations – including 
the Holy See, several anti-choice organizations, and a core of Islamic states – that 
were less sympathetic to the imperative of gender justice. 15 Th ough gender played 
  8) Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the ICC Statute speciﬁ cally designate the crimes of rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, and other forms of 
sexual violence as war crimes whether committed in international or non-international armed con-
ﬂ ict. Th e same crimes are listed as crimes against humanity. ICC Statute,  supra note 4, Art. 7(1)(g). 
Enslavement as a crime against humanity is also deﬁ ned with reference to the traﬃ  cking of women 
and children.  Ibid. , Art. 7(2)(c). 
  9)  Ibid ., Art. 7(1)(h). 
 10)  International Criminal Court,  Elements of Crimes (U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2) p. 2, 
n.3 (2000). 
 11)  ICC Statute,  supra note 4, Arts. 36(8)(b) (Judges), 42(9) (Oﬃ  ce of the Prosecution), and 43(6) 
(Victims and Witnesses Unit). 
 12)   Ibid. , Art. 36(8)(a)(iii). 
 13)   Ibid ., Art. 21(3). 
 14)  For a discussion of the contributions of the Caucus and other feminist organisations,  see Barbara 
Bedont and Katherine Hall-Martinez, ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the International 
Criminal Court’, 6  Brown Journal of World Aﬀ airs (1999) 65. Th e Caucus, reorganised in 2004 as 
the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, is now focused on monitoring the Court’s implementa-
tion of the gender provisions of the ICC Statute and channeling the concerns of women in the 
regions in which the ICC is working.  See < www.iccwomen.org/ >. 
 15)   See Janet Halley, ‘Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related 
Violence in Positive International Criminal Law’, 30  Michigan Journal of International Law (2008) 
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a central role in the negotiations surrounding other aspects of the ICC Statute, 
there was no mention of gender in the recent negotiations to add the crime of 
aggression to the ICC Statute and little involvement by non-governmental organ-
isations focused on advancing the interests of women worldwide. Instead, the 
negotiations were dominated by states with sovereign agendas as varied as alter-
natively preserving or eroding the power of the Security Council in international 
relations. 16 
 As a result of the recently-concluded negotiations, the crime of aggression has 
been deﬁ ned as follows:
 Article 8  bis 
 Crime of aggression
  1.  For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, prepara-
tion, initiation or execution, by a person in a position eﬀ ectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, 
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
  2.  For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed force by a 
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the follow-
ing acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression. 17 
 Th e deﬁ nition then provides a list of “acts of aggression” (such as invasion, bom-
bardment etc.) drawn verbatim from Article 3 of General Assembly Resolution 
3314, the instrument that was meant to guide the Security Council in exercising 
its U.N. Charter-based duties to respond to breaches of the peace and acts of 
aggression. Th e amendments thus deﬁ ne two phenomena – a crime of aggression, 
set out in subsection 1 of the Article, and an act of aggression, set out in subsec-
tion 2. Th ese two inquiries will generally be considered in reverse order such 
that the act of aggression committed by a state serves as a predicate for the pros-
ecution of an individual for the crime of aggression. Th us, an individual will be 
held liable for the crime of aggression only when he or she plans, prepares, initi-
ates, or executes one or more acts of aggression through the machinery of a state. 
Only those acts of aggression that by their “character, gravity and scale” constitute 
1 (discussing role of activists in negotiations to ensure the ability to prosecute sex crimes within the 
statutes of the international criminal law tribunals). 
 16)   See Beth Van Schaack, ‘Negotiating at the Interface of Power & Law: Th e Crime of Aggression’, 
49  Columbia Journal of Transnational Law  ( 2011) __ (forthcoming) (discussing the negotiating 
dynamics at the Kampala Review Conference where the amendments were adopted). 
 17)   Rev. Conf. of the Rome Statute, 13th plenary meeting (I.C.C. Doc. RC/Res. 6) (advance version) 
(11 June 2010), < www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf > [hereinafter 
Resolution RC/Res.6]. 
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a “manifest violation” of the Charter, viewed objectively, can give rise to the crime 
of aggression. 
 Needless to say, it would be a singular achievement if the codiﬁ cation and 
prosecution of the crime of aggression were able to reduce the incidence of con-
ﬂ ict in the world and give real content to the ‘right to peace’ that would improve 
the lives of so many women. 18 And yet, there is a risk that codiﬁ cation of the 
crime of aggression may result in more  ex post prosecutions of leaders launching 
aggressive campaigns at the expense of  ex ante eﬀ orts to halt threatened or ongo-
ing violence. 19 A number of elements of the aggression amendments implicate the 
concept of humanitarian intervention – a fact not lost on delegates during the 
negotiations. Delegates could have framed the deﬁ nition to more expressly leave 
open a space for exempting humanitarian intervention from prosecution. But 
very few such proposals were seriously considered, let alone adopted. Most 
importantly, delegates rebuﬀ ed several eﬀ orts by the United States to explicitly 
preserve a right to engage in truly humanitarian intervention and instead favoured 
more implicit language to this eﬀ ect. Th e result is that the various organs of the 
Court will enjoy considerable discretion in dealing with such scenarios. 20 
 3. Exempting Humanitarian Interventions 
 Once it began participating in the negotiations in November 2009, the United 
States took the position that the deﬁ nition of aggression under consideration was 
ﬂ awed and that the apparent consensus on the elements of the crime masked 
signiﬁ cant disagreements regarding what types of sovereign conduct could consti-
tute the crime of aggression. By the time of the Kampala Review Conference, it 
was clear that delegates were loath to reopen negotiations over the deﬁ nition, 
especially at the behest of a latecomer. As a result, the U.S. delegation endeav-
oured to address perceived problems through a series of ‘Understandings’ to pre-
serve an opening for claims about the legality of humanitarian interventions and 
 18)   See U.N. General Assembly Resolution 33/73,  Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life 
in Peace , (U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/73) (Dec. 15, 1978); Philip Alston,  ‘ Peace as a Human Right’, in 
Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H. Weston (eds.),  Human Rights in the World Community , (1980) 
p.  198. 
 19)  Kenneth Anderson, ‘Th e Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended 
Consequences’, 20  European Journal of International Law (2009) 333 (noting how international 
criminal law has emerged as an alternative to intervention). Th e International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, for example, has been criticised for being a consolidation prize in lieu of a 
more robust military response to atrocities. 
 20)  Th e early negotiation history is available in Stefan Barriga, et al., Th e Princeton Process on the 
Crime of Aggression: Materials of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression , 2003-2009, 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009). 
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other arguably legitimate, yet potentially unlawful, uses of force. 21 Th e ability of 
the United States to advocate this position was complicated by its central role in 
orchestrating two military interventions laying claim to the humanitarian man-
tle: Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003. 
 Th e United States’ eﬀ ort to make explicit reference to a right of humanitarian 
intervention in the Understandings failed when delegates rejected the following 
proposed language:
 It is understood that, for purposes of the Statute, an act cannot be considered to be a manifest 
violation of the United Nations Charter unless it would be objectively evident to any State 
conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith, and thus 
an act undertaken in connection with an eﬀ ort to prevent the commission of any of the crimes 
contained in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of the Statute would not constitute an act of aggression. 
 As an alternative, the United States sought other interpretive language focused on 
gravity and purpose to more indirectly preserve the ability of states to engage in 
humanitarian interventions. 
 3.1. Resolution 3314 
 One angle was to tether the deﬁ nition of aggression more closely to Resolution 
3314, adopted by the General Assembly by consensus in 1974. 22 Although sup-
porters of the current deﬁ nition touted its Resolution 3314 pedigree, the amend-
ments depart from that instrument in subtle yet signiﬁ cant ways. Most 
importantly, both Resolution 3314 and the U.N. Charter 23 envision a continuum 
of unlawful uses of force, only some of which rise to the level of aggression. Th e 
ICC deﬁ nition, by contrast, is susceptible to a reading that every violation of 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as well as violations of a state’s “sovereignty” is 
 21)  Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, made the following intervention 
in Kampala: 
 Although we respect the considerable eﬀ ort that has gone into the Princeton Process [the 
intersessional aggression negotiations], we believe that without agreed-upon understandings, 
the current draft deﬁ nition remains ﬂ awed. We are concerned that the apparent consensus on 
the wording of Article 8bis masks sharp disagreement on particular points regarding the 
meaning of that language that must be addressed before the amendments on the crime of 
aggression can enter into force. 
Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State Statement at the Review Conference 
of the International Criminal Court (4 June 2010), < www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/142665
.htm >. 
 22)  U.N. General Assembly Resolution  3314 , U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (U.N. 
Doc. A/9631) 142-43 (1974). 
 23)  Article 39 of the U.N. Charter describes three prohibited uses of force: “threat[s] to the peace, 
breach[es] of the peace, or act[s] of aggression.” U.N. Charter, art. 39. 
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an “act of aggression”. Echoing language from Resolution 3314’s preamble, the 
United States managed to attain a formal Understanding to the eﬀ ect that “It is 
understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal 
use of force . . .”. 24 In addition, the United States successfully advocated the adop-
tion of an Understanding that reads:
 [A] determination whether an act of aggression has been committed requires consideration of 
all the circumstances of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and 
their consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
 3.2. Identifying a “Manifest” Violation of the U.N. Charter 
 Only those acts of aggression that constitute a “manifest” violation of the U.N. 
Charter will give rise to a prosecution for the crime of aggression. Th e term “man-
ifest” in Article 8(1), which was never deﬁ ned, emerged as a compromise term 
that bridged the positions of two sets of delegates. One camp wanted no thresh-
old at all. Th is position was premised on the theory either that every act of aggres-
sion should be subject to prosecution, or that only “the most serious crimes of 
international concern” would be prosecuted before the ICC. 25 In the other camp 
were delegates that sought a higher threshold to limit prosecutions to “ﬂ agrant” 
breaches of the U.N. Charter, wars of aggression, “unlawful” uses of force, or acts 
of aggression geared toward occupying or annexing territory. Any one of these 
qualiﬁ ers – with the exception perhaps of “ﬂ agrant” – might have made it less 
likely that individuals engaged in  bona ﬁ de humanitarian interventions would be 
prosecuted for the crime of aggression. 
 Th e United States succeeded in raising the threshold on the term “manifest” 
slightly with an Understanding that states:
 It is understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest viola-
tion of the Charter of the United Nations, the three components of character, gravity and scale 
must be suﬃ  cient to justify a “manifest” determination. No one component can be signiﬁ cant 
enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself. 
 Given the degree of variation in states’ preferences, the term “manifest” remains 
ambiguous: to some, the word refers to the degree of legal clarity surrounding the 
state’s conduct; to others, the word denotes some level of seriousness (in terms of 
the impugned act’s scale or consequences) or wilfulness. Th e focus on “conse-
quences” in the Understandings allows for an opening to argue that a military 
operation that may have violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as a technical 
matter might not be deemed to constitute an act of aggression by virtue of the 
 24)  All the understandings appear in Annex II of Resolution RC/Res.6,  supra note 17. 
 25)  ICC Statute,  supra note 4, Art. 1. 
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fact that it ultimately improved the situation on the ground by protecting civil-
ians and vulnerable groups from further attack. 
 4. Purpose and Intent 
 One avenue for creating an opening for humanitarian interventions that was not 
fully explored would have been to tinker with the  mens rea element of the crime 
of aggression with respect to the deﬁ nition of the “crime of aggression”. 26 As it 
stands, the deﬁ nition of “crime of aggression” contains a combination intention/
knowledge-of-fact formulation: the defendant must intend to commit an enu-
merated act of aggression and must have knowledge of the factual circumstances 
that render the act a manifest violation of the Charter (e.g., the absence of Security 
Council authorisation or the absence of a prior attack by the putative victim 
state). Th e defendant need not, however, have knowledge of the applicable legal 
doctrine concerning the use of force. If drafters in Kampala had followed reason-
ing from some Nuremberg-era jurisprudence 27 and required proof of a height-
ened mental state implying some illicit purpose behind the actions – such as a 
speciﬁ c intent or motive element or some showing of bad faith, malice, wilful-
ness, or hostile intent – they might have provided a textual basis for distinguish-
ing  bona ﬁ de from pretextual humanitarian interventions. 28 
 In the alternative, delegates could have added some notion of motive or inten-
tionality to the deﬁ nition of the state act of aggression, bearing in mind the dif-
ﬁ culty of attributing an ‘intention’ to an artiﬁ cial entity like a state. For example, 
the United States suggested that the Court be directed to consider the state’s 
“purpose” for using force when determining whether an act of aggression had 
been committed, which would have provided a potential opening to argue for the 
legality of humanitarian interventions. Alternatively, along the lines of a prior but 
abandoned German proposal, “act of aggression” could have been deﬁ ned with 
reference to the wilfulness or hostile intent behind a governmental policy. In the 
 26)   See Elise Leclerc-Gagné and Michael Byers, ‘A Question of Intent: Th e Crime of Aggression 
and Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention’, 41  Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
(2009) 379. 
 27)  In the  High Command Case , the tribunal stated that the lawful or unlawful character of a war 
turns on its purpose: “Whether a war be lawful, or aggressive and therefore unlawful under inter-
national law, is and can be determined only from a consideration of factors that entered into its 
initiation. In the intent and purpose for which it is planned, prepared, initiated, and waged is 
to be found its lawfulness or unlawfulness.”  United States v.  Von Leeb (Th e High Command Case), 
 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law 
No. 10 (1949) pp. 462, 486. 
 28)   See Andreas L. Paulus, ‘Peace through Justice? Th e Future of the Crime of Aggression in a Time 
of Crisis’, 50  Wayne Law Review (2004) 27 (noting requirement under German law that the defen-
dant must possess the speciﬁ c intent to disturb the peaceful coexistence of peoples). 
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alternative, the deﬁ nition could have listed a series of prohibited purposes, such 
as conquest, establishing a military occupation in the victim state, launching a 
war of aggression, achieving the annexation of the other state’s territory, acquiring 
the other state’s material resources, undermining the political independence of 
the state, or violating a state’s neutrality. None of these proposals was adopted, 
and so the purpose behind a particular use of armed force can be considered only 
with reference to the terms character, gravity, and scale. 
 5. Character, Gravity and Scale 
 Under the provisions ultimately adopted, the only way for any party to address 
potentially unlawful but nonetheless legitimate uses of force is with reference to 
the tripartite factors of character, gravity, and scale. Drafters did not consider how 
these factors should be deﬁ ned, leaving it to the Court for interpretation. Both 
gravity and scale, while not entirely synonymous, refer to the severity, magnitude, 
and consequences of a particular use of force. Indeed, both scale and character are 
arguably components of gravity that cannot really be assessed independently. Th e 
term “character”, as a more qualitative term, is the most elastic of the three factors 
and might provide an opening to argue that an act of aggression was not commit-
ted with hostile intent or for aggressive purposes. 
 6. Particularised Defences 
 Finally, delegates could also have subjected the crime of aggression to special jus-
tiﬁ cations or excuses. Negotiators did not, however, seriously consider amending 
the ICC Statute provisions addressing available defences. As it stands, individual 
defendants under indictment for the crime of aggression can invoke all of the 
existing defences – subject to whatever adaptations are necessary – set out in the 
ICC Statute. In particular, Article 31(1) provides that a defendant may be exon-
erated if he is acting in self-defence, in the defence of others, or under duress. 
Subparagraph (1)(c) – the only provision that implicates the crime of aggression 
directly – states: “Th e fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation 
conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal 
responsibility under this subparagraph”. Th us, neither self-defence nor the 
defence of others is automatically proven in situations in which the defendant is 
acting on behalf of a state engaged in self-defence, presumably within the terms 
of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 29 Delegates could have added a provision to 
 29)  Th is provision states: “Th e fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted 
by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this 
subparagraph”. 
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allow more clearly for a consideration of whether the state’s use of force was moti-
vated by the defence of others. Article 31 is addressed to individual defences and 
does not easily accommodate ‘defences’ that might be raised by the putative 
aggressor state at the stage in the proceedings at which the state act of aggression 
is under consideration. Indeed, it is unclear procedurally whether either the 
impugned state or the putative victim state will have standing to participate in 
the aggression determination absent amendment to the ICC Statute or Rules of 
Procedure. 30 
 7. Chilling Humanitarian Intervention in Th eory and Practice 
 It remains to be seen whether and how the adopted Understandings will impact 
on the  travaux préparatoires or inﬂ uence prosecutions before the Court in light of 
their uncertain legal authority. 31 Some delegations supported the content or 
impulse behind the rejected Understandings, but deemed them unnecessary or 
superﬂ uous; others expressed concerns as to their very content. Many were sym-
pathetic to the idea that humanitarian interventions should not be prosecuted as 
the crime of aggression, but preferred to grant the Court discretion in this regard. 
Given this ambiguous record, it will be for the various organs and constituencies 
of the ICC – including the Prosecutor exercising prosecutorial discretion and the 
Pre-Trial Division ﬁ lter – to determine how to address future humanitarian inter-
ventions. By virtue of this delegation of interpretive authority, the ICC is thus 
poised to play a role as arbiter on the legality of humanitarian interventions. Th e 
variety of meanings of the term ‘manifest’ coupled with the nuances contained in 
the Understandings provide tentative grounds for  bona ﬁ de humanitarian inter-
ventions to avoid scrutiny by the Court under the rubric of the crime of 
aggression. 
 Nonetheless, because the crime is expansively and ambiguously deﬁ ned, the 
potential exists for the new aggression provisions to chill arguably beneﬁ cent uses 
of force that lack Security Council approval, such as: multilateral, regional, or uni-
lateral peacekeeping missions and humanitarian interventions; rescue  operations; 
 30)   See Beth Van Schaack, ‘Question on the ICC Aggression Filter’,  IntLawGrrls , 24 July 2010, 
<intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/07/question-on-icc-aggression-ﬁ lter.html>, (discussing lack of 
standing of states during the aggression determination);  See International Criminal Court,  Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1) 
(2000). 
 31)   See Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Are the Understandings Valid?’,  Opinio Juris, <opiniojuris.org/2010/06/16/
are-the-aggression-understandings-valid/>, (arguing that the seven understandings adopted at 
the review conference should be ignored by the judges); Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Marko Milanovic on 
Understandings’,  Opinio Juris, <opiniojuris.org/2010/06/16/marko-milanovic-on-understand
ings/>, (arguing that the Court must consider the understandings as part of the interpretive frame-
work for the treaty). 
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or even (more controversially) military responses to acts of terrorism that might 
incapacitate terrorist organisations and prevent future attacks. Humanitarian 
interventions may be more susceptible to being chilled than other uses of force of 
ambiguous legality.  Bona ﬁ de humanitarian interventions are discretionary and 
often do not directly implicate sovereign prerogatives as do actions compelled by 
an extension of a right of self-defence. Th e risk of chilling the exercise of such an 
‘imperfect duty’, if it can even be called that, is thus greater. 32 Indeed, even in the 
face of a horriﬁ c genocide, the international community found a host of excuses 
for not intervening more robustly in Rwanda. Th e codiﬁ cation of a crime of 
aggression without any humanitarian exception provides one more excuse for 
inaction in the face of atrocities. To be sure, creating a penal forum to judge uses 
of force may discourage states from undertaking pre-textual humanitarian inter-
ventions. At the same time, the way in which the crime of aggression as been 
codiﬁ ed might also derail creative thinking geared toward establishing universal 
standards and designing institutions to manage interventions and protect against 
abuses. 33 Th e international community must continue its work on the responsi-
bility to protect doctrine with an eye toward establishing standards that the Court 
can employ in making the predicate aggression determination in the face of argu-
ably humanitarian uses of force. 
 8. Intervening on Behalf of Women 
 For those of us concerned about augmenting international law’s ability to protect 
women, should we care about over-deterring humanitarian interventions and 
other uses of force that do not constitute an a hostile attack or rise to the level of 
aggressive war? It is unlikely that feminist thinkers will ever universally come to 
terms with the idea of a just war. 34 To be sure, many feminists have fought for 
more robust forms of intervention in conﬂ ict zones where women were at risk. 35 
Th ese calls intensiﬁ ed when the Taliban began imposing a form of gender apart-
heid in Afghanistan. 36 It took the attacks of September 11th, however, for the 
 32)   See Gary Banham,  Kant's Practical Philosophy: From Critique to Doctrine (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006) pp. 186-198 (discussing Kant’s notion of an imperfect duty). 
 33)   See Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Th e Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan 
Institutional Proposal’, 18  Ethics & International Aﬀ airs (2004) 1 (proposing the establishment of a 
council of democratic states to vet proposed interventions). 
 34)  Of course, the feminist perspective on many areas of law is neither static nor monolithic; rather, 
it is multifaceted and is constantly evolving.  See Lucinda Peach, ‘An Alternative to Paciﬁ sm? 
Feminism and Just-War Th eory’, 9  Hypatia (1994) 152. 
 35)   See Catharine A. MacKinnon, ‘Women’s September 11 th : Rethinking the International Law of 
Conﬂ ict’, 47  Harvard International Law Journal (2006) 1. 
 36)   See ,  e.g. , Feminist Majority Foundation,  Stop Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan , < www
.helpafghanwomen.com/Global_Petition_Flyer.pdf >. 
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United States to mobilise Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Although 
the plight of women under the Taliban was not a prime motivator for the inter-
vention, the rhetoric surrounding the intervention appropriated feminist con-
cerns about the quality of women’s lives under Taliban rule to garner the support 
of domestic and international constituencies for the Operation. 37 Indeed, the 
propaganda value of violence against women has long been recognised. 38 To date, 
preventing harm to women has served only as a convenient makeweight argu-
ment in the service of interventions initiated for other rationales. 39 
 To be sure, interventions have been launched or considered in situations that 
have featured grave violations of women’s rights. Th at said, interventions that did 
go forward have not necessarily beneﬁ ted women across the board. It is now clear 
that women in Afghanistan have not necessarily fared better following the partial 
ouster of the Taliban. 40 Nor were the women of Kuwait liberated along with their 
country by Operation Desert Storm. 41 Even in Kosovo, where NATO’s interven-
tion halted an ethnic cleansing, the introduction of foreign troops occasioned a 
dramatic increase in sex traﬃ  cking and forced prostitution. 42 
 37)  Ann Russo, ‘Th e Feminist Majority Foundations Campaign to Stop Gender Apartheid: 
Intersections of Feminism and Imperialism in the United States’, 8  International Feminist Journal of 
Politics (2006) 557, < www2.hawaii.edu/ ~dasgupta/RussoFMF.pdf>, (arguing that the Feminist 
Majority Foundation was complicit in the Bush Administration’s appropriation of feminist ideas to 
justify interventions). 
 38)  Susan Brownmiller,  Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (Fawcett Books, New York, 1975) 
pp. 40-48. 
 39)  Th e plight of women has also been employed to justify keeping troops in Afghanistan.  See Aryn 
Baker, ‘What Happens If We Leave Afghanistan’,  TIME , 9 August 2010. Th e magazine has been 
criticised for cynically using violence against women as propaganda in support of the continued 
engagement in Afghanistan and presenting a falsely dichotomous dilemma—women remain safe if 
the foreign troops stay on or women are left to be mutilated if the troops leave.  See Derrick 
Crow, ‘TIME’s Epic Distortion of the Plight of Women in Afghanistan’,  Rethinking Afghanistan , 
31 July 2010, <rethinkafghanistan.com/blog/2010/07/times-epic-distortion-of-the-plight-of
-women-in-afghanistan/>. 
 40)   See Human Rights Watch, ‘Th e “Ten-Dollar Talib” and Women’s Rights’, 13 July 2010, pp. 6, 
21, < www.hrw.org/sites/default/ﬁ les/reports/afghanistan0710webwcover.pdf >, (arguing that “far 
from ensuring that the rights of women are respected, the current Afghan government has regularly 
sold them short” and that women have few opportunities to assert their rights in today’s Afghanistan 
because “powerful factions in the government and parliament … are opposed to many of the rights 
and freedoms that women now enjoy.”). 
 41)   See Amnesty International, ‘Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries: Women Deserve 
Dignity and Respect’, < www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=DAC1E87CECCA7C1780256F
CE00586B83&lang=e >. Women in Iraq remained subjugated as well.  See Foreign & Commonwealth 
Oﬃ  ce, ‘Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses’, November 2002, pp. 8-9, <image
.guardian.co.uk/sys-ﬁ les/Guardian/documents/2002/12/02/hrdossierenglish.pdf>, (detailing 
abuses against women after the ﬁ rst Gulf War). 
 42)  Samantha Godec, ‘Between Rhetoric and Reality: Exploring the Impact of Military Humanitarian 
Intervention Upon Sexual Violence – Post-Conﬂ ict Sex Traﬃ  cking in Kosovo’, 92  International 
Review of the Red Cross (2010) 245-247. 
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 Many strains of feminism – whether based on an aﬃ  rmative essentialism borne 
of biological reductionism or premised on theories of diﬀ erential socialisation 
and social constructivism – are closely tied to paciﬁ sm in rejecting the masculinist 
impulse to resort to arms in the face of conﬂ ict. 43 Th e temptation to invoke 
armed intervention in the face of atrocities may limit the ability of the interna-
tional community to imagine, design, and implement other non-violent forms of 
conﬂ ict resolution. 44 While ostensibly protective, humanitarian interventions 
threaten more violence, at least in the short term (if not longer). 45 Such opera-
tions valorise militarism and entail the deployment of armed force capable of 
causing great destruction, injuring civilians, and devastating societies. Doing so 
in the name of humanitarianism or even in the defence of women does not negate 
the harm caused to civilians who become collateral damage or are violently dis-
placed. Th e idea of humanitarian intervention in defence of women also furthers 
the vulnerable victim narrative by portraying women as in need of a heroic male 
saviour. 46 Th at said, anyone who is the innocent victim of violence deserves to be 
rescued from her predicament, and encouraging women to exercise their auton-
omy and agency is simply folly when they are looking down the barrel of a gun. 47 
 43)  Betty Reardon,  Sexism and the War System (1985) (portraying women as inherently peaceful and 
anti-militaristic); Mary Caprioli, ‘Gendered Conﬂ ict’, 37  Journal of Peace Research (2000) 51 (posit-
ing with data that domestic gender equality has a pacifying eﬀ ect on state foreign policy decisions). 
 But see Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Are Women Peaceful? Reﬂ ections on the Role of Women in Peace-
Building’, 16  Feminist Legal Studies (2008) 347, 349, 359 (citing authorities that challenge the link 
between feminism and paciﬁ sm); Carolyn M. Stephenson, ‘Feminism, Paciﬁ sm, Nationalism, 
and the United Nations Decade for Women’,  5  Women's Studies International Forum  (1982) 5-6 
(critiquing the determinative linkage between women and peace) . 
 44)   See Strategic Objective E.3, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference 
on Women , (U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20) (1995) and (A/CONF.177/20/Add.1) (15 September 
1995) (calling on the international community to “[p]romote non-violent forms of conﬂ ict resolu-
tion and reduce the incidence of human rights abuse in conﬂ ict situations.”); Sara Ruddick, 
 Maternal Th inking Towards a Politics of Peace  (1995) pp . 141-159;  ibid ., xviii-xx (discussing poten-
tial for nonviolent action in the face of atrocities) . 
 45)  Karen Engle, ‘“Calling in the Troops”: Th e Uneasy Relationship Among Women’s Rights, 
Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention’, 20  Harvard Human Rights Journal (2007) 189 
(“I am uneasy with the idea that destroying life and infrastructure is a way to demonstrate con-
cern for a particular place or situation, especially when most of history has shown that such 
intervention—regardless of motivation—rarely improves the lives of the individuals who are the 
stated subjects of intervention.”). 
 46)  Godec,  supra note 42 (arguing that “saving women” narratives “are regressive for women’s 
rights.”). Th is attitude appears in an orientalist or neo-colonialist form where western troops are 
portrayed as rescuing women from barbaric practices.  See Faiza Hirji,  Th e War for Women's Freedom: 
Orientalist Imaginaries of Rescue in Afghanistan (2005), < www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa
_research_citation/0/1/4/7/9/p14796_index.html >. 
 47)  Christine M. Chinkin, ‘Kosovo: A “Good” or “Bad” War?’, 93  American Journal of International 
Law (1999) 843 (observing, “How can I, as an advocate of human rights, resist the assertion of a 
moral imperative on states to intervene in the internal aﬀ airs of another state where there is evi-
dence of ethnic cleansing, rape and other forms of systematic and widespread abuse, regardless of 
what the Charter mandates about the use of force and its allocation of competence?”). 
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 Despite these concerns with part practice, it is possible to envision a beneﬁ cial 
humanitarian intervention on behalf of women. Ancient 48 and modern just war 
theories suggest some elements that would be required for any valid interven-
tion. 49 Factors often mentioned include: action by a legitimate authority; pursuit 
of a right intention (the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil); abuses 
that exceed some gravity threshold; the use of force as a last resort after eﬀ orts at 
diplomacy, negotiation and other sanctions had failed; a proportional response; 
and a reasonable prospect of success. In terms of legitimate power, a prioritising 
of Security Council action, or at a minimum multilateral or regional action, is a 
central feature of modern theorising about humanitarian intervention. And yet, 
uncertainties surrounding the deﬁ nition of the crime of aggression, coupled with 
the checkerboard jurisdictional regime, will no doubt impede coalition-building, 
adherence to military alliances, and other multilateral responses to global threats. 
Th e unequal threat of prosecution among states may give rise to diﬀ erential toler-
ances for the degree of uncertainty inherent to the reach of the aggression amend-
ments. Th e concomitant diﬃ  culty in mobilising joint action may paradoxically 
lead to more unilateral actions by states not subject to the aggression amend-
ments 50 or the moderating eﬀ ects of joint action. Th us, the existence of the crime 
on the books may ultimately make multilateral action more diﬃ  cult. 
 An additional requirement would be that such an intervention would result in 
the diminution rather than escalation of violence. Although humanitarian inter-
ventions involve armed force, one can surmise that parties engaged in just wars 
might ultimately produce less collateral damage than those engaged in aggressive 
wars due to the fact that combatants and their commanders are likely to assign 
diﬀ erent values to the variables employed in the proportionality calculus (military 
utility and the risk of collateral harm) than their hostile adversaries. Th ese vari-
ables are elastic by design and provide a certain degree of latitude to combatants 
to implement military strategy. Arguably, those involved in non-hostile uses of 
force might demand a greater degree of military necessity to justify a course of 
conduct or tolerate less potential for collateral harm in choosing their targets. 51 
Indeed, at the risk of melding the  jus in bello and the  jus ad bellum , an argument 
could be made that combatants engaged in a humanitarian intervention should 
 48)   See Larry May,  et al. ,  Th e Morality of War: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Perason, 2006) 
110 (compiling just war theories through the ages). 
 49)   See ICISS,  Th e Responsibility to Protect ,  supra note 6. 
 50)  Th e nationals of non-party states and states that opt out of the aggression provisions cannot be 
prosecuted for the crime. Resolution RC/Res.6,  supra note 17, Art. 15bis(4)-(5). 
 51)   But see  Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , < www.icty.org/x/ﬁ le/About/OTP/otp_report
_nato_bombing_en.pdf >, (discussing potential war crimes committed during Kosovo intervention, 
but declining to go forward with prosecutions). 
0001286957,INDD_PG2766   491   5/4/2011   10:29:25 AM
492 B. Van Schaack / International Criminal Law Review 11 (2011) 477–493
be subject to heightened duties under humanitarian law in light of their ulterior 
protective purposes. 52 
 It is diﬃ  cult to construct a feminist framework for humanitarian intervention 
on behalf of women under contemporary conditions, when women are so often 
excluded from decisions about uses of force. 53 Humanitarian intervention may be 
more palatable to feminists, and ultimately more beneﬁ cial to women, when 
women are included in decision-making surrounding the propriety of military 
intervention, 54 as opposed to other responses, 55 as well as in the design and imple-
mentation of such operations. 56 Security Council Resolution 1325 – the ﬁ rst 
thematic resolution on women, peace and security – recognised the potential for 
women to be peacemakers and reaﬃ  rmed the importance of their “equal partici-
pation and full involvement in all eﬀ orts for the maintenance and promotion of 
peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with 
regard to conﬂ ict prevention and resolution”. 57 Resolution 1820, which supple-
ments 1325, focuses on sexual violence and signals the Council’s “readiness” to 
“adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systemic sexual violence”. 
Th ese landmark resolutions indicate that such abuses fall within the Council’s 
jurisdiction as threats to international peace and security 58 and have the potential 
to surpass any gravity threshold required for humanitarian action. Th e resolu-
tions thus provide a theoretical platform with a Security Council imprimatur to 
integrate women and women’s groups into decision-making about the propriety 
and execution of humanitarian intervention. 59 Th at said, empirical evidence sug-
gests that Resolution 1325 has exerted only a modest impact on peace processes 
 52)  Ruti Teitel, ‘Th e Wages of Just War’, 39  Cornell International Law Journal (2006) 695. 
 53)  Chinkin,  supra note 1, p. 279 (“Th e reality of who is making those decisions [on behalf of the 
state] and the eﬀ ect of those decisions upon individuals within States may well take on a diﬀ erent 
perspective when examined from a gendered viewpoint.”). 
 54)  Helen Stacy, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Relational Sovereignty’, in Stephen Lee (ed.), 
 Intervention, Terrorism, and Torture (2006), < www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/7.1.06_stacy.html >, 
(arguing that the consensus of at-risk citizens should be assured before any intervention is launched). 
 55)  Christine Chinkin,  Peace Agreements as a Means for Promoting Gender Equality and Ensuring 
Participation of Women ,  United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women Expert Group 
Meeting (13 November 2003) p. 10, < www.peacewomen.org/assets/ﬁ le/Resources/Academic/Part
_PeaceAgrmentsGndrEqual_ChinkinLSE_2003.pdf > (noting that the “[f ]ailure to include [wom-
en’s] views and ideas can lead to an impoverished understanding of peace and security that focuses 
on militarism and power supported by force.”). 
 56)  Peach,  supra note 34 (noting that women are absent from legal and ethical inquiries about war). 
 57)  U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325) p. 1 (31 October 2000). 
 58)  U.N. Security Council Resolution 1820 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820) para. 1 (19 June 2008). 
A subsequent resolution noted the perennial under-representation of women in formal peace 
processes notwithstanding the mandate for women’s greater inclusion set forth in Resolution 1325. 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1960 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1960) p. 1 (19 June 2008). 
 59)   See Alain-Guy Tachou-Sipowo, ‘Th e Security Council on Women in War: Between Peacebuilding 
and Humanitarian Protection’, 92  International Review of the Red Cross (2010) 197. 
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to date and that much remains to be done to fully integrate women into decision 
making about how to manage armed conﬂ icts. 60 
 9. Conclusion 
 If we care about what happens to women in war, we should do everything in our 
power to decrease the incidence of war in the ﬁ rst place. It is too early to tell 
whether the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute will be able 
to do this. Once again, we ﬁ nd ourselves in a reactive posture asking the ‘woman 
question’, which entails exploring the gender implications of the law 61 and engag-
ing in a continuing task of determining how legal doctrines and institutions – 
which women played little hand in constructing – aﬀ ect women. 62 It is possible 
at this stage, however, to anticipate the impact that the new provisions may have 
on the nascent doctrine of responsibility to protect. Th is article should not be 
read as a ringing endorsement of humanitarian intervention, as we must remain 
vigilant about “the dark sides of virtue”. 63 Th e codiﬁ cation of a broad crime of 
aggression, with few openings to argue for the legality or legitimacy of uses of 
force for humanitarian purposes, certainly complicates this vital process of doc-
trinal development. Nonetheless, exigent threats to women’s rights remain. Th is 
sad truth justiﬁ es our continual work toward developing a normative and proce-
dural framework that will allow  bona ﬁ de humanitarian interventions to proceed 
without threat of prosecution for the crime of aggression. 
 60)   See Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, ‘Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? Th e Impact 
of the UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and Th eir Agreements’, 59  International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2010) 941 (noting a slight increase in references to women in peace 
processes since the passage of Resolution 1325, especially in situations in which the United Nations 
is involved). 
 61)   See Katharine T. Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’, 103  Harvard Law Review (1990) 829, 836, 
837 (advocating that feminists ask “the woman question” both to “expose how the substance of law 
may silently and without justiﬁ cation submerge the perspectives of women and other excluded 
groups” and to “identify the gender implications of rules and practices which might otherwise 
appear to be neutral or objective.”). 
 62)  Doris Buss, ‘Is International Criminal Law Feminist?’, in Cecilia M. Bailliet (ed.),  Th e Creation 
of International Law: An Exploration of Normative Innovation, Contextual Application, and 
Interpretation in a Time of Flux (2010) (“When faced with an existing institutional apparatus . . . 
feminist advocates often do not have the luxury of opting out. Th e realm of legal and political work 
for feminists has, to a degree, already been deﬁ ned.”).  See also , in this special issue, Doris Buss, ‘Is 
International Criminal Law Feminist?’, (11)3  International Criminal Law Review (2011) 409-423. 
 63)  David Kennedy,  Th e Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton 
University Press, Priceton, 2004). 
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